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• Air NZ/Qantas case raised an interesting
question
• Competition policy (Antitrust) is based on
one big economic idea
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• Results in two things:
– Transfer of money from consumers to
suppliers
– Deadweight Loss due to restriction of output
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The great battle in Antitrust for past twenty
years has been about:
• Relative weight to be given to transfers
and deadweight loss
• Traditional Antitrust: transfers to
producers from consumers are bad
• Efficiency-based Antitrust: transfers net
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• New Zealand authorities (NZCC, High
Court) have gone further than anywhere
else in adopting pure efficiency-based
anti-trust
• Against the (purpose of) the Law?
• Never mind...
• Ask now: is it necessarily true that
monopolists ‘restrict’ output?
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• The point is that T.O.L. pricing wastes
value
• Keener customers get the product for less
than their willingness to pay
• And less keen customers don’t get to
consume the product at all even though










Surplus value captured by keeners
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• Do some lateral thinking
• Query the key assumption
• The assumption of T.O.L. pricing
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• Obvious challenge for firm’s pricing
managers
• Capture that surplus
• Well, suppose they succeeded
• Specifically, suppose a monopoly
supplier succeeded in perfect price
discrimination
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• Economists call this price discrimination
• Airlines call it yield management
• Definition: “Price discrimination is charging
different prices to different customers for the
same or similar product (where, if the
products are not identical, the costs of
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Implication:
• Consumers may pay a lot, on average
• But no deadweight loss!
Case dismissed?
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• I decided to investigate further
• Already knew how pervasive is price
discrimination
• In many (most?) markets, there are at
least two prices:
- the posted or  sticker or rack-rate price











The University of Auckland
18
Passenger Air Travel Market
• Massive PD for more than twenty years
• Brilliant invention: Saturday Night Stay
over Requirement
• Purpose: to separate high-value
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• Great idea, but
• Like all restrictions
• SNS restriction destroys some of the
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Air New Zealand’s World-leading
Innovation




 Menu of prices offered simultaneously
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• Express does make the cheaper fares
more attractive to the high-value
customers (cannibalises the business
market)
• But it also makes them (much) more
attractive to everyone else
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Basically, Express is a bold attempt to
grow the market by reducing average
fares
“Simplicity is the essence of affordable travel.
Fare structures were extensively simplified and
prices reduced by an average of 20% and up to
50%.  The everyday low fares stimulated traffice
by 22%...capacity increased by 10%” (Air New
Zealand Annual Report, 2003)
• Air NZ’s rival Qantas quickly copied the system
• And so, now, has Delta in the U.S.
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These ‘new’ fare systems work in two
dimensions
• They have a ‘horizontal’ offering of different prices
for the same flight.  You can buy whichever one you
like
• The idea is to add ‘features’ to the more expensive
tickets that cost less to provide than they are worth
to the people who buy them
o eg, offer FFP and status points to people who aren’t
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And they have a ‘dynamic’ dimension:
• number of seats available at lowest fares is limited
• When the fare ‘bucket’ is filled, a new bucket is
offered of seats at a higher price
This system of ‘yield management’ attempts to fill
each flight with the highest-value customers
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I I set out to study this:
• found that there is no standard theory or
model of price discrimination in oligopoly
– So I developed the theory
• found there was no empirical analysis of NZ
domestic and Trans-Tasman airfare pricing
– So I collected data and analysed this, with
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Results: Theory
For imperfect (3rd Degree Price
Discrimination) with a finite and not large
number of price steps (or “fare buckets”):
• Increasing PD (ie more price steps)
– increases the high/low dispersion of
prices
– but makes no difference to the average
price paid [!]
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• These results hold too for oligopoly
• That is, under (linear) Cournot-Nash
assumption, the average price charged by
an oligopoly with n firms is not changed
by the number of price steps!
• And, price dispersion decreases as
number of firms increases
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Results: Empirics
• Data: took the lowest offered price on Air NZ
and Qantas websites
• For about 100 flight numbers on 9 routes
– eight domestic NZ (4 with Qantas)
– Auckland-Sydney
• Wednesday flights from Nov 17, 2004 through
Jan 05, 2005
• Each flight observed about 12 times, beginning
nine weeks before actual flight date
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Estimated two models using EViews 4
Dependent variables:
• Average (lowest) fare
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• LNPWAVK:   LOG [ WEIGHTED AVERAGE LOWEST FARE   PER
KILOMETRE ]
• PDIFF: RATIO LARGEST/SMALLEST LOWEST FARE
• LNDIST:    LOG [ NON-STOP ROUTE DISTANCE ]
• AKLSYD:   DUMMY = 1, IF ROUTE IS AUCKLAND-SYDNEY
• HH:   HERFINDAHL/HIRSCHMAN INDEX BASED ON NUMBER
OF DAILY FLIGHTS BY AIR NZ AND QANTAS ON A ROUTE
• SOLDDUM:  DUMMY  = 1, IF FLIGHT SOLD OUT BY FLIGHT
DATE
• PEAKDUM:  DUMMY = 1, IF FLIGHT APPEARS TO BE A ‘PEAK-
TIME’ BUSINESS FLIGHT
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0.4642    S.D. dependent var0.63726Adjusted R-
squared
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0.7035    S.D. dependent var0.06873Adjusted R-squared
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Summary of Empirical Findings:
• Presence of competitor(s) reduces fares
• Air New Zealand earns a fare (fair?)
premium over Qantas
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Implications for Competition Policy
• If, before, you were mainly worried about the
distributional implication of market
dominance
– You should still be just as worried
• But, if your concern was with the allocative
efficiency implications of dominance
– You can be less worried
